Forceful anticorruption campaigns are common in authoritarian regimes but systematic evidence on how they actually work remains limited. We develop predictions about the patterns of enforcement based on the two fundamental challenges faced by autocrats: (1) containing mass discontent from below and (2) eliminating challengers within the elites. We test these predictions using both aggregate enforcement data ) and a new dataset that tracks the political fates of over 3,000 Chinese officials from 2000 to 2015. We find that the overall intensity of anticorruption is inversely related to the regime's economic performance, and individual-level investigations systematically shun away from clients of incumbent leaders, while disproportionately targeting those affiliated with incumbents' rivals. Additional tests suggest that the discrepancy in enforcement cannot be explained by differential corruptness alone. Finally, we find that the recent anticorruption initiatives by Xi Jinping have led to a significant centralization of power within a smaller inner circle. * Earlier versions of this paper received valuable comments from Monika Nalepa and Congyi Zhou. We would like to thank
Soon after Xi Jinping assumed office as China's top leader in November 2012, he launched an anticorruption campaign of unprecedented scale. In just over two years, not only was a former Politburo Standing Committee member, a position widely believed to enjoy immunity to corruption charges, taken down, the disciplinary agency of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has also put twelve members of the Central Committee under investigation, a number equivalent to that of the previous two decades combined. Apart from high-level officials, who are commonly referred to as "big tigers," the campaign has also targeted the rank and file of the Party, or the "flies." The number of party members who received disciplinary sanctions increased by over 40%, from 160,718 in 2012 160,718 in to 232,000 in 2014 160,718 in (CDIC 2013 160,718 in , 2015 . While Xi's anticorruption campaign may stand out in its sheer scope and intensity, he is by no means the first authoritarian ruler to ever wage war on corruption. Many of his predecessors in China carried out similar campaigns to varying degrees during their respective reigns. Periodical surges in anticorruption enforcement have also been commonplace in many other authoritarian systems. In both the former Soviet Union and Putin's Russia, for example, political authorities have from time to time brought officials-sometimes in large numbers-to trial for corruption.
1 In an early survey of anticorruption initiatives in the Middle East and North Africa, Gillespie and Okruhlik (1991) find that 12 out of the 19 major dictatorships in the region carried out various types of corruption cleanups during the period from 1976 to 1986. 2 Both Cuba and Vietnam have severely punished corrupt officials in the past (Domínguez 1993; The Economist 2014) . More recently, Venezuela has also witnessed a significant intensification of antigraft enforcement that has led to the downfall of a number of officials, including several high-ranking political figures (Associated Press 2013).
Despite the pervasive presence of such practices in the authoritarian world and the 1 For examples, Clark (1993) details anticorruption campaigns in the former Soviet Union under Andropov and Gorbachev. Krastev and Inozemtsev (2013) reports a more recent anticorruption initiative by Putin that implicated multiple ministries and resulted in the sacking of the Defense Minister and the imprisonment of a Deputy Minister of Regional Development.
2 The statistics are calculated by the authors based on information provided from the original article (Table 1 and footnote 50). Dictatorship is defined as having a negative polity score at the time of the corruption cleanup.
intense international and domestic attention that they typically attract, anticorruption initiatives undertaken by autocratic leaders remain poorly understood by scholars of comparative politics. At the theoretical level, the fact that unelected rulers have periodically undertaken forceful measures against anticorruption appears to contradict the conventional wisdom about authoritarian regimes. According to the conventional view, political survival of authoritarian rulers depends first and foremost on the support from a small group of ruling elites (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004; Svolik 2012) . To secure their loyalty, autocrats need to provide the elites with private benefits and privileges, which include, among other things, the opportunity to grab (Wintrobe 1998; Magaloni 2006) . Anticorruption measures are at odds with this fundamental compact made between the leader and his ruling coalition. As Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2004, 102) put it, "To the extent that eliminating corruption...[is] public goods, leaders with small winning coalitions have few incentives to find and eliminate corruption." Autocrats' permissive attitudes toward corruption is often used to explain why nondemocracies tend to be more corrupt than consolidated democracies (Montinola and Jackman 2002; Treisman 2007) .
What, then, motivates them to go after corrupt officials when they have in part relied on the distribution of rents to sustain their rule?
At the practical level, there is also wide disagreement over the causes and nature of these drastic anti-graft measures. China observers, for example, have offered contrasting perspectives on the recent anticorruption campaign by the CCP. While proponents consider it as a demonstration of Party leaders' sincere commitment to a clean government and a harbinger of more significant institutional reform down the road (Chen 2014; Zheng 2014 ), critics regard it as short-term, opportunistic, and selectively enforced by the incumbents to achieve their ulterior motives (Murong 2015; Schiavenza 2013) . Neither side of the debate, however, has been able to substantiate their claims with anything other than anecdotal evidence or speculations from a few high-profile cases.
In this paper, we fill in these gaps by conducting a systematic investigation of anticorruption enforcement in contemporary China. We argue that authoritarian anticorruption is motivated by two fundamental political imperatives faced by autocratic leaders (Svolik 2012 ): The first is to contain mass discontent from below, and the second is to eliminate potential challengers and consolidate power within the ruling elites. Based on these two imperatives, we develop predictions about how the intensity of anticorruption enforcement will vary both over time and among officials with different types of political affiliations. We test these predictions empirically using both aggregate enforcement data and a new dataset that tracks the careers of over 3,000 officials who have served in city and provincial leadership positions from 2000 to 2015. We find that, at the aggregate level, the overall intensity of anticorruption enforcement is greater in times of slow economic growth and high inflation. At the individual level, investigations systematically avoid implicating clients of the incumbent power holders, while disproportionately targeting those affiliated with the incumbents' political rivals. We conduct several additional tests to evaluate whether the observed discrepancy in enforcement rates can be explained by the alternative explanation that the underlying corruptness is different across clients of different patrons. The results from these tests consistently reject the alternative explanation in favor of the theory of selective enforcement. Finally, we show that the recent anticorruption initiatives by Xi Jinping have led to a significant centralization of power within a smaller inner circle.
The subject of corruption has long interested social scientists. While the causes and impact of corruption have received a great deal of scholarly attention, research on anticorruption enforcement has so far been confined to policy-oriented discussions. Existing studies tend to presuppose the presence of a benevolent political leadership and focus primarily on the more technical issue of how to improve the effectiveness of anticorruption measures. While some studies do discuss the political motivations behind anticorruption, the explanations tend to of an ad-hoc nature and have limited applicability beyond their specific contexts. Our contribution to this literature is both theoretical and empirical.
Theoretically, we provide a coherent framework for understanding how the considerations for popularity and power jointly shape anticorruption enforcement in authoritarian regimes. Our theoretical framework not only produces generalized and testable predictions about the timing and the likely targets of anticorruption operations, but also accounts for the varying degrees of success authoritarian regimes have had in curtailing corruption.
Empirically, this study offers the first large-scale, quantitative study on how anticorruption investigations work at both the aggregate and individual levels in an authoritarian setting. So far, the scholarly knowledge on this matter has been drawn mostly from journalistic and expert accounts that have been predominantly speculative and focused on a handful of major cases, partly due to the difficulties in collecting comprehensive data in authoritarian regimes. By analyzing a universe of officials who are potential targets of anticorruption investigations, we offer a more rigorous assessment of the patterns of enforcement carried out in nondemocratic regimes. While our analysis confirms some of the long-standing observations, in particular the selective nature of anticorruption enforcement in China (Fan and Grossman 2001) , it also adds new insights that have been previously overlooked when working with only a small number of cases.
By showing how informal connections with high-level politicians affect the odds of investigation, the individual-level analysis also contributes to the literature on the political consequences of patron-client relations in authoritarian regimes in general and China in particular. Contrary to the literature's common assumption that membership in informal networks always brings strictly higher payoffs to the participants in terms of more resources, greater career security and better promotion prospects (Shih 2004; Shih, Adolph and Liu 2012; Willerton 1992) , we show that ties with high-level patrons may turn into significant liabilities once the patrons have lost political battles and become targets themselves. Our findings suggest that seeking to be part of a patronage network can entail substantial political uncertainty that is beyond the control of individual clients and thus may not always be the strictly preferred strategy for those who are sufficiently risk averse.
Explaining Anticorruption in Authoritarian Regimes
We argue that anticorruption measures are taken by autocratic leaders to address two fundamental challenges to their rule (Svolik 2012) . The first challenge comes from the masses below. Although not having to win popular votes, few authoritarian leaders can rule solely by fear and repression. Some degree of voluntary support from the citizens can not only mitigate the threat of mass uprisings from below, but also reduce autocrats' dependence on agents of repression, such as military and security forces, which themselves pose a threat to the autocrats (Wintrobe 1998) . There are several tools that autocrats possess in their repertoire for boosting political legitimacy. While the most common strategy is to provide material benefits, such as economic growth and/or welfare, dictators can also undertake measures that demonstrate the superior moral and political performance (White 1986) . To the extent that corruption is regarded as a pathological attribute in almost all political cultures and has been found to have deleterious effects on citizens' evaluations of the political system (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Seligson 2002) , cracking down on corruption not only helps a ruler improve his/her personal image among the masses but may also serve to restore public faith in the regime as a whole.
Compared to other methods for boosting legitimacy, however, anticorruption is an inherently risky option. By bringing corruption to the center of the political agenda, a ruler is effectively acknowledging to the public that he has either been unable to curtail corrupt activities in the past or at least been been ignorant to the presence of such activities in his own administration. Neither narrative is desirable from the perspective of the ruler.
Moreover, exposing corruption scandals the system may also increase citizens' awareness to these issues (Lü 2014) and update their beliefs about the corruptness of the system-a move that may do more harm than good to the regime's image. The uncertainty over public reactions explains why autocrats often work strenuously to control the procedure of these investigations and the information released to the public. More importantly, it implies that rulers will typically not resort to this measure until they have exhausted all other options. Only in times when widespread corruption is public knowledge and other methods of legitimation are either ineffective or unavailable (e.g., due to changes in economic crisis or external political pressure), would authoritarian rulers consider betting their survival on the success of anticorruption campaigns. There is, of course, no guarantee that such initiatives will necessarily save the falling regime. Chiang Kai-shek, for example, launched a forceful anticorruption campaign to salvage public confidence right before he lost mainland China to the CCP (Taylor 2009 ). Similarly, anticorruption measures undertaken by Gorbachev on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union only further undermined the system's legitimacy and accelerated its demise (Holmes 1993 ).
These observations lead to the following hypothesis: In addition to concerns about popular uprisings from below, anticorruption enforcement can also be driven by power struggles among the ruling elites. Exposing corruption scandals, as discussed above, may generate controversial public reactions that could hurt the ruler's popularity if not carefully managed. Arrests and replacement of key personnel in the system could significantly disrupt the existing power equilibrium. Aspiring elite challengers may exploit these opportunities to undermine the ruler's popularity and power base by strategically directing criticisms and investigations to the ruler's followers, or sometimes even to the ruler himself. Clark (1993) , for example, finds that in the later years of the Brezhnev era, rising leaders such as Andropov and Gorbachev used corruption investigations as a strategic weapon to weaken the power and influence of Brezhnev's faction and to shore up their own popularity. Even in Singapore, a system known for its effective, impartial anticorruption enforcement, elite challengers have reportedly sought to tarnish the public image of the incumbent leaders by initiating anticorruption investigations on their private transactions (Worthington 2003 ). At the most basic level, therefore, power-conscious autocrats need to defend their own power base amidst anticorruption initiatives by carefully calibrating the scope of these investigations to avoid implicating allies who they rely on for support and resources. Losing control over the choice of targets not only undermines one's substantive political power, but also signals political weakness that may further alienate supporters and embolden challengers.
When incumbents have firm control of the anticorruption apparatus, they can, of course, do much more with that power than merely protect their cronies. Indeed, corruption investigation is one of the most effective tactical devices that autocrats can employ to swiftly (and legally) remove political enemies from the scene. Using forceful measures, such as restrictions of personal freedom and freezing of bank accounts, autocrats can immediately reduce opponents' abilities to exert political influence. Thorough investigations of the targets' political and financial backgrounds under the pretext of anticorruption may further reveal informal networks among the challengers and their secret agendas, giving incumbents both informational and strategic advantage in dealing with their rivals. Moreover, when there is concrete evidence of corruption, which is not rare to find given the pervasiveness of corruption in those systems, charging a rival with corruption, as opposed to political conspiracy, treason, or ideological difference, is arguably the least politically controversial strategy as far as public opinion is concerned. Through carefully orchestrated show trials, public humiliation, and demonstrations of the opponent's economic and moral depravity, rulers can rally public support behind their move against the opponents and deter other potential challengers from emerging. 
Anticorruption in China
Anticorruption in China is primarily carried out by the CCP's own Discipline Inspection Commissions (DICs), which conduct preliminary investigations of government and Party officials before transferring them to the prosecutors. DICs can initiate investigations based on information of corruption obtained from a variety of sources, including, but not limited to, their own routine monitoring, reports from whistle-blowers, and tips from other agencies. Once an investigation is initiated, the DICs can search for relevant documents and evidence, question witnesses, withhold illegal gains, and most importantly, require involved individuals to provide explanations at a specific time and place. The last method, famously known as shuanggui (双规), grants DICs the power to exercise extralegal detention (Sapio 2008) , making them formidable agencies with de facto coercive power. Officials who are subject to shuanggui can be held by DICs for months or even years without legal proceedings. After the DIC's investigation is concluded, decisions will be made as to whether the official should receive party sanctions, be removed from office, or transferred to the judiciary. If the last option is chosen, the case will be handed over to the procuratorate and tried in courts. Once a case is transferred, prosecution and conviction are almost certain, and appeals can rarely change the verdict. According to our data, over 85% of the officials investigated by DICs were prosecuted for related charges, and virtually all of those prosecuted were eventually convicted in subsequent trials.
DICs are subject to dual leadership from both the higher level supervising DICs and the party committees at their own levels.
3 Although filing corruption cases requires formal approval from the higher level DICs, it has been widely noted that the de facto authority over the investigation process lies with the party committees at the same level, which often control key material and personnel resources that DICs need for conducting their investigation as well as carrying out daily operations (Guo 2014) . In particular, the party chiefs (i.e., the party secretaries) of party committees enjoy substantial influence over the investigation process. They have, in the words of Manion (2004), "the specific and general powers to make or break" investigations against their subordinates, by either instructing DICs to probe certain officials or blocking investigations of others.
Aggregate-Level Analysis
We begin by testing the popularity hypothesis using aggregate enforcement data collected from Law Yearbooks of China. Our key outcome of interest is the total number of corruption cases-embezzlement, bribe taking, and diversion of public funds-filed by the procuratorates nationwide each year. The surge of corruption investigations in 1989 serves as a good illustration of the logic of popularity-driven anticorruption. The years leading up to the event saw deteriorating economic conditions for ordinary citizens (Zhao 2004) . With the expansion of university admission and enterprise reform, the government was no longer able to guarantee job placements for college students after graduation. At the same time, aggressive price reforms produced soaring inflation that threatened the subsistence of those living on fixed wages. Both conditions generated widespread resentment among the populace, which eventually led to massive protests and demonstrations in the spring of 1989. After CCP re-established its grip on power through violent repressions, the top leaders realized that something had to be done to salvage the Party's plummeting public support and to ensure long-term regime survival. Since communist ideology was no longer appealing and economic growth and inflation control needed time to take effect, anticorruption became a convenient option. As stated by Deng Xiaoping (1993) in the immediate aftermath of the crackdown:
(We) need to punish corruption. . . (and) bring people real achievements. Only then will people calm down. Otherwise someone will go on the street today and another one tomorrow. If we fail to consider this issue from a deeper perspective, then one month, two months or three months of tranquility still won't be reliable.
Deng urged Party leaders to achieve something concrete, including cracking down on corruption, in order to win back people's hearts. Soon after the crackdown, the Party issued a document entitled "Decision on Doing Several Things that the Masses Are Concerned with (关于近期做几件群众关心的事的决定)" in which dealing with corruption come top of the list. Enforcement against corruption was significantly tightened afterwards:
Not only did the authorities set a deadline for those who had committed corruption to report themselves to the authorities, but ordinary people were also encouraged to report instances of corruption. These measures resulted in a conspicuous surge in the number of corruption cases.
To more rigorously test this hypothesis, we run time-series regressions with the following specification.
Our two key independent variables are lagged GDP Index and Consumer Price Index (CPI), which measure two important dimensions of economic performance-growth and inflation. The dependent variable is the total number of corruption cases filed by the procuratorates nationwide in a given year t. 4 We conducted the augmented Dicky-Fuller test and find that the dependent variable is trend stationary. We thus include a linear time trend in the regression. We also include a set of regime dummies to remove any differences in enforcement levels across different leadership, 5 and a variable that controls for the total number of Civil cases during the same period. Given the time-series nature of our data, serial correlation is a natural concern. Hence, in addition to the OLS, we also conduct Prais-Winsten estimation, which is a GLS procedure that takes care of first-order autocorrelation.
6
The key quantities of interest in the time-series model are δ 1 and δ 2 , which tell us how much anticorruption intensity changes as a result of previous year's economic performance. Our theory predicts that anticorruption enforcement is more likely to intensify in times of poor economic performance. Hence, we should expect a negative coefficient for δ 1 and a positive coefficient for δ 2 . Table 1 
Individual-Level Analysis
The aggregate-level analysis supports our first hypothesis that the overall intensity of authoritarian anticorruption is inversely related to the regime's economic performance.
In this section, we test the second hypothesis by examining whether the selection of anticorruption targets is shaped by political leaders' considerations for power.
Data and Sample Construction
Empirically, testing this hypothesis of selective enforcement is challenging for two reasons.
First, an accurate assessment of whether the enforcement is biased requires researchers to identify a universe of subjects who are potential targets of enforcement but who have experienced different outcomes. In most cases, such a universe is too large to collect data on, and innovative designs have been developed to circumvent this limitation (Gordon 2009 ). In our particular study, however, it is possible to collect information on a partial, but important set of officials who all face similar risk of corruption investigations by the DICs as our universe. Specifically, we construct our sample by first identifying officials Among all civilian Politburo members since 1997, for example, 78.2% of them have had served in at least one of these positions before they rose to prominence.
10
We are able to identify a total of 3,142 officials. For each of them, we create a sequence of person-year observations that track changes in their political careers, starting in the year of 2000 or the year the official started his/her first key regional leadership position, whichever is later. The sequence continues on to 2015, unless either of the two exit conditions is met: (1) the subject received a disciplinary/legal sanction 11 or (2) the official died due to a natural cause/accident or reached the age of 75.
12 Of all 7 We also include districts and counties under centrally administered municipalities (直辖市的区县) 8 We only focus on civilian leaders, as career information about military officers is scant and often incomplete.
9 For instance, we do not cover ministers or national leaders who have no regional leadership experience. 10 Calculation based on own data. 11 There is no single individual in our sample who has received repeated sanctions. So a single sanction should be regarded as a permanent exit.
12 Our observation continues on even after the subject has retired from all his/her formal posts. This is because for retired officials, the risk of being investigated is smaller, but non-zero. For cases of investigation of a retired official, see "广东茂名原政协主席冯立梅系退休两年后被查", March 30, 2014, Dongfang Daily, http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/fanfu/content-3/detail_2014_ the subjects in our sample, 2,867 (∼ 91%) continue on to 2015, 64 (∼ 2%) exit the sample before 2015 due to natural causes (natural/accidental death or reaching 75), and 211 (∼ 7%) exit due to disciplinary or legal sanctions. The majority of the sanctions (> 90%) were due to corruption-related activities such as embezzlement, bribe-taking, or sale of offices, and a relatively small number of officials were sanctioned for dereliction of duty or malfeasance after major public health or safety incidences. Our main dependent variable Anticorruption Investigation is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if an official has received the first type of sanction in a given year and 0 otherwise.
13 In doing so, we effectively assume that other forms of hazards, such as outbreak of major public accident or natural/accidental death, are independent from anticorruption investigations.
Measuring Informal Political Relations
A second empirical challenge to our study is to reliably identify informal relations among In this paper, we adopt a new approach that infers patronage ties by linking lower level officials with higher level political leaders who were in power when the officials were first promoted to key political offices. The rationale is that since career advancement is one of the most valuable resources in closed, hierarchical systems, patrons will disproportionately favor their own clients in making promotion decisions. Specifically, we define a lower level official C as a client of a higher level official P if and only if both of the following conditions are met:
03/30/35279032_0.shtml. 13 For 2015, our investigation data is updated up to August 1st.
1. C has experienced significant career advancement in a region or organization where P was serving as the head of that region or organization.
2. P had the authority to decide the promotions that C has experienced. In other words, our measure will produce fewer false positives (non-clients measured as clients) at the expense of more false negatives (clients measured as non-clients). This may create an attenuation bias that prevents us from finding significant results.
The merit of our promotion-based approach over the overlap-based one can be illustrated by the recent fall of Si Xinliang, a provincial official from Zhejiang province. Si has had extensive shared work experience with general secretary Xi Jinping and Zhang Dejiang, another sitting member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), both of whom served as provincial secretaries in Zhejiang. The conventional measure would suggest that Si had strong political ties to the top leadership and therefore have trouble explaining his investigation. A closer look at the timing of Si's career, however, reveals that his first major promotion (to city secretary of Huzhou) was made prior to the arrival of both Xi and Zhang. In particular, Si experienced no significant career advancement under Xi's watch. Hence, our measure would suggest that Si was not on particularly good terms with the current general secretary, which is likely to be closer to the reality. 14 14 A recent report suggests that Si was indeed close to Gu Liping, the wife of Ling Jihua, and Ling
Estimation Framework
Given the nature of the event we are interested in, the hazard model is the most ap- 
where i indexes the subject and g the starting post. Given the way we construct the sample, subjects can enter the sample as either a city or a provincial leader. t denotes the number of years a subject has been in the sample since 2000 or his/her first year at a target post (whichever comes later). q g (t) is the post-specific baseline hazard, which is modeled by interacting the natural cubic splines with a dummy variable for the starting post (0=city leader, 1=provincial leader ). We also include a set of year dummies jurisdictions. Therefore, we should expect officials who have ties with the sitting PSC members and provincial secretaries to enjoy systematically lower rates of investigation than those who do not (i.e., θ 1 , θ 2 < 0). In addition, we also include two measures for ties with other members of the ruling coalition, including the non-standing Politburo members (PB) and retired PSC members, 15 who are usually not directly involved in crafting anticorruption plans, but are nonetheless influential players in national politics.
To the extent that their continued support is valued by the incumbents, we expect officials affiliated with these other coalition members to also receive some degree of protection from anticorruption enforcement (i.e., θ 3 , θ 4 < 0). Xi's predecessor. Bo, Zhou, and Ling were allegedly involved in a major conspiracy against Xi's succession to power before the 18th Party Congress, and all of them are now under arrest for corruption charges (Shi 2015) . The fall of these elite challengers is likely to have significant impact on the fates of their followers, making them the priority targets in anticorruption investigations. This implies that the estimate for ν should be positive.
17
15 In constructing the variable for retired PSC members, we only consider those who have just retired from the preceding administration. For example, as of 2008, the group of retired PSC members include Zeng Qinghong, Wu Guanzheng and Luo Gan. Moreover, to avoid double counting, we exclude Zhou Yongkang, who is both a retired PSC member after 2012 and a political rival to Xi Jinping.
16 Since Ling did not serve in any significant regional positions, we measure his clients by additionally identifying those who were born in Yuncheng, Ling's hometown.
17 Since political rivalry is incumbent-specific, we code the rival dummy in the following way: The variable takes the value of 1 if an official is (1) connected to Chen Liangyu between 2006 and 2009, or Results Table 2 displays the main empirical results from the hazard models. The first column presents the most parsimonious model with only the five connection variables. The second column adds fixed effects for the province in which the subject served in his/her first observation in our sample. The fixed effects for starting province are intended to capture the unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity across different provinces that might affect both the opportunity for corruption and the likelihood of establishing ties with future national leaders.
18 The third column adds key demographics, and the final column adds three indicators for career background. To ease interpretation, all coefficients are presented in odds ratios, which represent the effect of a one-unit change in a given variable on the relative probability of being investigated in a given year. The overall pattern of the results is consistent with our second hypothesis: Ties with the incumbent central and local decision-makers-PSC members and the provincial secretaries, respectively-both significantly reduce the odds of being investigated by a margin of roughly 50%. In addition, the point estimates for the effect of connections with other ruling coalition members also indicate a sizable reduction in the odds of investigation. However, the standard errors of these estimates are too large to assert statistical significance.
(2) connected to Bo, Zhou, or Ling after 2012, and 0 otherwsie. 18 For instance, there are usually more opportunities for corruption in large, economically advanced provinces. It is also easier to become clients of a powerful patron in those provinces, given that many national leaders have served in those provinces. Ignoring the heterogeneity among provinces can create an upward bias that attenuates the negative coefficients that we obtain. More notably, we find that connections with the group of political rivals have very large, positive effects on the likelihood of investigation. All else equal, having ties with any of the elite challengers effectively triples the odds of being investigated. To interpret this result in more substantive terms, we calculate the predicted probability of investigation for an official who has all his observable attributes set at the median value of the sample.
The year-on-year probability of investigation is about 0.5%. Assuming the probability of survival for each year is independent, the cumulative probability that the official will fall within 10 years is about 5.2%. 19 Having ties with the political rivals increases the yearon-year probability of investigation to 1.8%, and the cumulative probability to 16.8%.
Next, we investigate how the degrees of protection and targeting vary with one of a key observed attribute of the subjects-age. To the extent that the value of a client depends on his future services, younger officials are usually more valuable assets to a patron as they are expected to stay in the game for much longer. As a result, we expect incumbents to exert greater effort to both protect younger members of their own factions and target those of the rivals' factions. To test this prediction, we first group the variables for ties with PSC members and provincial secretaries into a single indicator Connected to the Incumbents and then interact this indicator, along with the variable on ties with the rivals, with Age. Figure 2 visually displays the results in terms of odds ratios. As expected, the differential treatment of subjects with different factional affiliations is most pronounced among young officials, but declines uniformly as subjects become older. For an official at the age of 55, 20 for instance, affiliation with the rivals' faction increases the odds of investigation by approximately 180%, whereas affiliation with the incumbents' faction reduces the odds by over 55%. When an official is at or above the age of 61, however, both the protection and the targeting effects become small and statistically indistinguishable from 0. 
Age Effect of Connection in Odds Ratio

Connected to Incumbents Connected to Rivals
Note: This figure illustrates how the effects of ties with the incumbents and rivals on anticorruption investigation change with the client's age. The shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals.
Alternative Explanation
The results from the preceding section have indicated that the investigation rate is significantly lower for officials affiliated with the incumbent power holders, but much higher for those who side with their challengers. An alternative explanation for this discrepancy, however, is that officials in the former group may be on average less corrupt than the latter. In this section, we conduct two additional tests following the strategies proposed by Gordon (2009) to evaluate whether the differential rates of investigation are due to different degrees of corruptness or faction-specific targeting.
The first test examines the sentencing outcomes of the sacked officials. The rationale for this test is as follows: If the incumbents' clients are systematically less corrupt, then for this group we should observe not only a lower rate of investigation, but also, conditional on investigation, lower severity of the revealed corruptness. 21 By contrast, if those officials are less frequently investigated not due to their superior integrity but rather due to the protection that their patrons offer, then we should expect the revealed severity of corruptness to be higher for those who are associated with the incumbents but nonetheless get investigated.
Since the degree of corruptness is a multidimensional object that is difficult to quantify, 22 we use the sentencing outcome as its low-dimension summary. If the alternative explanation were correct, the sentencing outcome would be lighter than average for those connected to the incumbents and heavier than average for those connected to the rivals.
It should be noted that the judiciary in the context of our study is, of course, unlikely to be unbiased. However, as long as it is biased in favor of the incumbents, the sentencing for incumbents' clients would be still lighter, thereby exacerbating, rather than attenuating the discrepancy in sentencing severity.
Empirically, we collect the information on sentencing outcomes for all the fallen officials who have been tried. We rank the sentencing outcome in the following order (from lighter to more sever): x years in jail (x from small to large), life in prison, death with reprieve, and death penalty. We estimate the effects of different types of connections using ordered probit. Table 3 displays the coefficient estimates from the regression (Column 1) along with the average marginal effects for the three most severe sentences (Columns 2-4). Although most of the coefficient estimates are quite noisy due to the small sample size, we find strong evidence that clients of the incumbent PSC members tend to receive significantly more, rather than less severe sentencing than others. Conditional on investigation, the probability of receiving life imprisonment is 16% higher for an official connected to the incumbent PSC members than for someone who is unconnected. The increases for death with reprieve and death penalty are 50 percentage points and 1.6 percentage points, respectively. At the same time, we find no evidence that the sentencing for those connected to the challengers is significantly higher than others. These results contradict the alternative explanation that differential corruptness is what drives the discrepancy in investigation rates across factions. Note: The table reports ordered probit results on severity of sentencing. Outcomes in the dependent variables are ordered as follows: no trial (lowest), x years in prison (ordered from small to large), life sentence, death penalty with reprieve, and death penalty. The first column reports the coefficient estimates, and columns 2 to 5 report the marginal effects of independent variables on the probability of receiving one of the three most severe sentencings.
The second test evaluates the plausibility of the alternative explanation by exploiting the temporal variations in the top leadership. The basic idea is that if the political leaders are indifferent toward officials with different factional backgrounds, the direction of change in the rates of investigation should be consistent for officials from all factions.
In other words, the levels of enforcement for those connected to the incumbents and those connected to the supposed challengers should move in tandem-either both rising when the threat from the masses is high or both lowering when such threat is low. By contrast, if top leaders do have preferences over different factions and such preferences differ across leaders, then alteration in the top leadership may lead to contradictory changes in the rates of investigation: Followers of those who entered top leadership may receive greater protection than they had before their patrons rose to prominence, whereas those associated with the incumbents' rivals would suffer higher rates of investigation only after the incumbents had taken effective control of the disciplinary apparatus.
Empirically, we focus on comparing changes in the rates of investigation before and Table 2 as controls 25 . Figure 3 presents the results in terms of odds ratios. For those connected to the would-be 18th PSC members, the odds of investigation dropped by over 20 percentage points, from merely -9.1% to -31.1% after their patrons formally assumed positions after 2012. During the same period, however, there was a significant increase in the rate of investigation for those affiliated with Xi's rivals. Interestingly, prior to Xi's accession to power, officials affiliated with his rivals were in fact enjoying a greater degree of protection than even the clients of the would-be PSC members (-69.2 % in odds ratio vs.
-9.1%). However, this benefit turned into a significant liability after 2012, with the odds of investigation for the rivals' faction spiking by over 240 percentage points. The contrasting directions of change between the two groups whose patrons face different political fates are again inconsistent with the alternative explanation of differential integrity, but lends support to the presence of political motivations in anticorruption enforcement. 
Effect of Connection in Odds Ratio
Note: This figure displays the changing effects of connections with (1) PSC members of the 18th Central Committee and (2) political rivals to Xi Jinping before and after 2012. The circles and triangles indicate the point estimates (in odds ratios) and vertical bars the 95% confidence intervals.
Anticorruption Under Xi Jinping
In this section, we return to our opening example. and (2) the rest of the PSC members. We plot changes in the rates of investigation for three terms of the general secretary: Hu's first and second terms and Xi's first term. We find that the probabilities of investigation for officials who had previously been promoted by the general secretaries and the CDIC chiefs are uniformly 0 throughout the period under investigation and does not change after Xi took power. However, it is the rest of the PSC members along with the Politburo members who are no longer able to offer the same level of protection to their clients as they used to. This pattern suggests that the anticorruption campaign has allowed Xi to remove his political rivals and considerably strengthen his own power vis-á-vis other members of the ruling coalition. 
Conclusion
Why do autocrats wage war against corruption when they have in part relied on the distribution of rents to sustain their rule, and who do they target in anticorruption campaigns? In this paper, we argue that anticorruption by autocrats is primarily motivated by the dual considerations of popularity and power. Using aggregate-and individual-level data from China, we show that political leaders in China have tightened enforcement in years when they could not draw on economic performance to secure political legitimacy, and maintained a discernible factional bias in picking targets of investigation.
Although our empirical analysis has focused on China, the general finding that autocrats strategically time and selectively pick targets in anticorruption campaigns to maximize their political interests pertains to a broader set of authoritarian regimes. In
Mexico under the PRI, for example, Morris (1991) Following the same logic, it is not difficult to understand why some authoritarian states have managed to make significant progress in reducing corruption: The ruler would only make serious effort to systematically lower corruption when they are in desperate need of popular support. In the case of Singapore and South Korea, for example, the political conditions under which significant anticorruption measures were introduced (both around the 1960s) have been aptly characterized as "systemic vulnerability" by Doner, Ritchie and Slater (2005) . Political leaders in these two countries needed to build broad coalitions in society in order to stay in power and counter external threats, but at the same time they lacked abundant resources that could be readily distributed to buy off support. Anticorruption thus became a quick and inexpensive strategy that these leaders could pursue in order to demonstrate political integrity and enhance the credibility of their promises of long-term prosperity, especially when short-term benefits from state-led developmental plans did not immediately come to fruition. A-3 
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